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INTRODUCTION
An efficient marketing system is essential to the well­
being of particular business firms and to the well-being of 
entire industries. If a business firm is to remain a profit­
able venture over time, it must be as proficient at selling 
its products as it is at producing them. A smoothly func­
tioning market system should be able to identify the differ­
ent opportunities for product sales available to a firm at 
various points in time and be structured to enable the firm 
to take advantage of the best opportunities available; 
essentially, it should yield the producer the highest price 
attainable for the offered product, net of marketing costs. 
Any marketing study must begin with the premise that the 
exchange of the final product is at least as important as the 
product's production. To ignore the marketing of the final 
product is to ignore profitability.
Since marketing arrangements are often quite complex and 
costly to organize, they are usually imbedded in various 
institutional structures. As marketing methods and techniques 
are constantly evolving, the institutions which serve to 
implement these techniques either evolve to incorporate the 
new developments or they are slowly replaced by new institu­
tions which effectively utilize the new methods. Whenever 
such institutional change is observed, it is useful to be 
able to identify the factors causing the changes and to 
reflect on the effects they will have on the future organiza­
tion of the industry and its firms.
This phase of the study of the Hawaii beef cattle 
industry has two major parts. The first is a survey of b^f 
cattle marketing arrangements currently in use on the Main­
land and in several foreign countries. These arrangements 
have been changing quite rapidly in recent years. The factors 
behind the rise and fall of various marketing arrangements 
will be discussed in light of the applicability of such 
marketing arrangements to the Hawaii beef cattle industry. 
The second is an analysis identifying alternative marketing 
arrangements which could be used in the marketing of Hawaii 
beef cattle. Their limitations and advantages are discussed; 
their efficiency relative to existing organizations is 
evaluated; and possible modifications of the existing 
marketing system are presented and evaluated.
GENE^RAL COMMENTS ON MARKET STRUCTURE
Before commencing with the study, it is helpful to 
briefly note some of the limitations and advantages inherent 
in this type of endeavor. First, it would be quite presump­
tuous for the authors to assume that the current marketing 
arrangement is an inefficient arrangement. This statement 
implies that an alternative marketing arrangement would not 
result in net gains to the buyers and sellers of the product
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in the current period. If an alternative arrangement could 
leave both parties (buyers and sellers) better off, then they 
would already be in the process of adopting and utilizing the 
new, more efficient arrangements. Clearly, the participants 
in the sales and purchases of a product have more information 
about their product than outside observers. Recommenda­
tions that a business firm adopt new procedures or a new 
marketing system are often made without the knowledge of 
specific problems of time, place, and circumstances that may 
only be known to the product's buyers and sellers. Thus 
analysts must be extremely cautious when evaluating long- 
established ventures' ways of doing business.
Second, although it is useful to assume that industry 
participants are operating efficiently given the current 
constraints on their behavior, one can ask whether the con­
straints serve to encourage efficient behavior. If an in­
dustry is operating under the shadow of an onerous law, it 
may be worthwhile to ask whether there would be gains to 
buyers and sellers (in total) if the law were to be repealed 
or amended. Similarly, marketing arrangements which are 
efficient given the existing consumer preferences, feed price 
structure, and technology may be dominated by other marketing 
systems if one of these parameters should change. If there 
are indications that one of these factors is changing or will 
be changing (such as a change in consumer preferences for a 
different form or grade of beef), then this type of study can 
provide useful information to evaluate a new marketing 
arrangement.
Third, this type of study can identify trends in the 
evolution of marketing systems in other countries and in the 
various cattle-producing regions of the United States. such 
information can be quite useful to the Hawaii beef cattle 
industry since it competes with beef imported from the Main­
land, New Zealand, and Australia. Further, many of the 
changing conditions in these producing regions which have 
resulted in new marketing arrangements may be relevant to the 
current or future situation in Hawaii.
Finally, this type of study can provide new information 
about alternative marketing systems. It is always possible, 
although quite unlikely, for market participants to be 
unaware of the advantages an alternative marketing structure 
could provide. This type of report can provide new informa­
tion to interested parties and encourage them to consider 
marketing arrangements previously thought to be infeasible. 
This report is structured with this intent. We provide 
information and analysis to enable market participants to 
make better decisions when they consider fundamental ques­
tions concerning the structure of the product market.
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MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES1
The worldwide marketing of beef cattle is a process 
characterized by a tremendous variety of institutional struc­
tures which serve an equally large variety of production and 
slaughtering organizations. This variety does not disappear 
when the focus is narrowed to just one country. A large 
number of marketing arrangements coexist in the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand, and most western European 
countries. It is quite common to observe beef cattle being 
simultaneously sold in auction markets, being directly deli­
vered to the slaughterhouse by the producer as the result of 
a direct contractual sale, or being sold to "assemblymen" who 
will pool a large number of cattle for sale at auction. 
Further, the beef may be marketed by individual producers, by 
producer cooperatives, or be produced and marketed within the 
confines of a vertically integrated producer and slaughter 
operation.
That such a large number of diverse market participants 
and marketing institutions are able to coexist over time in a 
large variety of economic environments leads us immediately 
to both an important conclusion and a cautionary note: .It. is
unlikely that we will be able to identify system of
marketing finished or unfinished beef cattle which is unam­
biguously more efficient than other systems, Moreover it is 
unlikely that such a system exists; if a particular institu­
tional arrangement were unambiguously more efficient than 
other arrangements, we would be observing a worldwide conver­
gence to such a system. With some products (such as national 
monies, stocks, automobiles, and hard grains) we have seen a 
convergence to a dominant marketing system. The existence of 
a wide variety of marketing systems for beef cattle between 
particular countries and within different countries is, how­
ever, evidence that particular marketing systems may be 
efficient at servicing particular types of buyer and seller. 
If some buyers and some sellers of beef cattle can reap gains 
from participating in a peculiar variety of marketing system, 
then the economy and the beef industry can gain only from the 
proliferation of various marketing systems.
On the other hand, although various marketing arrange­
ments coexist with one another, over the last thirty-five 
years some arrangements have become increasingly prevalent 
while others have declined markedly in importance. Prior to 
World War II, the live cattle market was the dominant form of 
marketing for all types of finished and unfinished cattle. 
Many governments (including the governments of Ireland, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom) explicitly encouraged 
the formation of such markets through the passage of legisla­
tive measures which either streamlined auction market sales
1 Unless otherwise specified, all the data reported in this 
section are taken from the two OECD publications.
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or taxed alternative modes of transaction. In spite of 
active governmental support of auction markets, since World 
War II live cattle auctions have been increasingly replaced 
by direct sales either to private slaughterhouses and/or to 
abattoirs (public slaughterhouses). The following table pro­
vides clear evidence that direct sales to slaughterhouses 
have become the dominant form of marketing beef cattle in 
most Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries:
Table 1
Sales of livestock via different marketing channels 
in some OECD countries during the mid-1970's 
(Approx. percent of total sales)
Direct Sales to Sales via
Slaughterhouses Livestock
Country and/or Packers Markets
Norway 100 0
Sweden 95 5
Germany 78 22
U.S.A., fed cattle 85 15
cows 50 50
Republic of Ireland 65 35
France 60 40
Canada 55 45
United Kingdom 50 50
Denmark 47 53
Given the above evidence, it seems worthwhile to examine 
the marketing of beef cattle in a variety of situations. In 
Sweden the use of auctions to market cattle has been 
completely replaced by cooperative arrangements while, in West 
Germany a substantial portion of beef cattle is still sold in 
auction markets. New Zealand's beef cattle are marketed using a 
wide variety of techniques. The following discussion focuses on 
these three countries as they will provide us an overview of the 
marketing techniques currently in use around the world and many 
features of their marketing systems may be relevant to the 
current situation in Hawaii.
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S w e d e n
It is immediately clear from Table 1 that the auction 
market has virtually disappeared in Norway and Sweden as a 
mechanism for marketing beef cattle. This development is due 
to the organization of Scandinavian farmers into cooperative 
organizations during the 1930's. The beef cattle producers' 
cooperatives operate cooperative slaughterhouses which pro­
cess all members' cattle. Auction markets disappeared for 
two reasons. First, nearly all cattle producers decided to 
join farmer cooperative associations which slaughter members' 
finished stock. Second, the rules of the Swedish meat mar­
keting cooperatives stipulate that the members of a coopera­
tive must deliver all of their cattle which they wish to sell 
to the cooperative. The cooperative must accept all of the 
cattle the members wish to deliver to the slaughterhouse. 
These two developments were sufficient to foreclose other 
marketing channels.
One of the main reasons for the success of the new 
marketing arrangements in Sweden is that the price of slaugh­
tered beef in Sweden is jointly determined by world markets 
and by the legislative actions taken by the Swedish Parlia­
ment. Legislative action influences the Swedish price of 
beef in two ways. First, the Parliament sets an import levy 
on foreign beef. Such a tariff encourages the domestic 
production of beef, but does not change the linkage of the 
Swedish market to the world price. Fluctuations in the world 
price are still reflected in Swedish meat prices. Second, 
the Parliament sets minimum and maximum prices beyond which 
the carcass price of beef cannot vary. This action reduces 
the risk that an individual farmer faces due to world price 
fluctuations. By insulating individual farmers from risk in 
the world market, this legislation reduces the complexity of 
the required marketing structure. Further, we are less like­
ly to see marketing institutions evolve which attempt to 
share or reduce risk, as the amount of risk present in the
market declines.
The tie of the Swedish beef price to the world beef 
price reduces the gains which would result from an auction 
marketing arrangement. Auctions have two basic functions. 
First, they adjust prices such that the market for the 
product clears. Second, an auction produces information
about the value of the asset; this information can be used to 
determine future production levels. Since the price of beef
cattle in Sweden is determined by the world (European) price
and Swedish tariffs on beef, an auction market would produce 
redundant information. Additionally, since Sweden is a small 
producer of beef cattle (relative to the total supply), Swedish 
farmers should be able to sell as much as they would like at the 
world price without affecting the market price of beef signi­
ficantly.
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Since the value of a slaughtered carcass is already 
determined, the producer and the slaughterhouse agree, in 
effect, to skip the costs of selling the animals at a live 
auction. Instead, they are directly delivered to the slaugh­
terhouse on consignment. The slaughterhouse is operated by 
the Swedish Meat Marketing Organization (MMO), which is owned 
by the producer cooperatives. MMO attends to the slaugh­
tering and sale of the members' livestock. The producer is 
paid according to carcass deadweight and grade. The sale 
price reflects the price of beef in world markets, adjusted 
for slaughtering costs. Since members will receive the 
residual from the operation of the slaughterhouse, major
disputes over the slaughterhouse charges are unlikely.
Within Sweden, each meat marketing cooperative has its 
own marketing area for which it is the sole supplier of
domestic beef. It must, nonetheless, compete with foreign
beef in this marketing area. Thus any market power possessed 
by the cooperative sterns from the tariff on imported beef, 
not from particular marketing arrangements.
Settlement prices, the prices paid to the cattle pro­
ducer, are published weekly in the cooperative's journal, 
Land. The producer also has the option to sign a delivery 
contract with the cooperative to specify the future date of 
delivery of a specified number of cattle to the slaughter­
house. These contracts usually contain provisions which
allow the cooperative to request delivery of the cattle any 
time during a three-week period. This provision helps the 
cooperative to smooth the flow of cattle entering the slaugh­
terhouse.
The Swedish Meat Marketing Organization has four funda­
mental structural characteristics common to cooperative 
organizations of agricultural producers in most Western 
countries. First, the cooperative's members must contribute 
to the capital stock of the cooperative. The contributions 
are usually directly related to the weight or value of the 
livestock delivered for slaughter.
Second, any residual funds accumulated by the coopera­
tive at the end of the accounting period are distributed to
the members according to their share of the capital stock.
This rule may reduce conflict over the percentage of the 
price which is retained by the cooperative to cover slaugh­
tering costs. Of course, the actions of the cooperative's 
manager must still be monitored by the cooperative's members 
to assure that they do not exaggerate the level of slaugh­
tering costs. Such monitoring is facilitated by requiring 
the manager to own shares in the cooperative. Any benefits 
taken by management in the form of higher costs (e.g., a 
larger office for the manager) would come partially from 
their own pockets; although they would have more nonpecuniary 
benefits at work, they would also have smaller earnings on
their shares in the cooperative.
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Third, the decisions of the cooperative are made accord­
ing to democratic principles. Each member has one vote at 
the cooperative's general meeting and all decisions are 
usually made by majority rule. This power is somewhat atten­
uated by the provisions in the Swedish Incorporated Associa­
tions Act which place some restrictions on the matters which 
a cooperative's members can consider at such meetings. With­
out some restrictions on the decision-making powers of the 
members, it would be possible for the small producers to form 
a coalition to pass rules and regulations which would favor 
smaller producers at the expense of larger producers. The 
result of such an action would be that large producers would 
withdraw from the cooperative and, perhaps, even establish a 
competing cooperative which would be more representative of 
their interests.
Fourth, the cooperative must allow all producers to join 
the cooperative with full membership privileges and responsi­
bilities. This provision is implicitly qualified by the rule 
which requires cooperative members to deliver all output to 
the cooperative. Some farmers will choose not to join the 
cooperative if the benefits from the occasional use of 
alternative marketing channels are sufficiently high.
The Swedish marketing channels are relevant to the 
situation in Hawaii for two reasons. First, Sweden, like 
Hawaii, is a small producer of beef cattle which possesses 
virtually no power over fluctuations in the beef cattle 
market price. Although tariffs influence the level of the 
market price in Sweden, fluctuations in the Swedish price of 
beef are closely tied to fluctuations in the world price of 
beef. Second, the auction market in Sweden is relatively 
unimportant; it does not play a substantial role in the 
determination of the prices beef cattle producers receive for 
their cattle. This particular point is also indicative of 
the situation in Hawaii. Finally, cooperative marketing 
structures have come to dominate the market in Sweden; this 
should give Hawaii producers cause to seriously consider a 
producers' cooperative as an alternative to the current 
marketing arrangements.
West Germany
The marketing of beef cattle in West Germany is sub­
stantially different from the marketing process observed in 
Sweden. Until the mid-1960's the auction market was the 
dominant form of beef cattle marketing in the Federal Repub­
lic. Over the last fifteen years the percentage of beef 
cattle marketed in the main and local auction markets has 
fallen dramatically. In 1955 sales of cattle on livestock 
markets constituted 48 percent of all sales in west Germany; 
by 1965 this figure had shrunk to 38 percent and by 1974 it 
had declined further to 23 percent. In spite of their 
declining share of the beef cattle market, livestock markets
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are nonetheless still important in the price determination 
process. Prices in direct sale transactions are usually 
closely linked to the prices prevailing on the auction 
markets. If the livestock markets were to disappear 
completely, it is quite likely that the direct sales market 
would operate less efficiently; the direct sales market tends 
to "free-ride" on the indicators of value (cattle prices) 
generated by the auction markets. In the absence of these 
markets, costs of concluding direct sales would rise, as the 
participants would have to devote resources to the task of 
determining the value of beef.
Why have producers and slaughterhouses increasingly 
chosen other methods of exchanging cattle besides the auction 
sale? One reason is that private slaughterhouses frequently 
pay farmers by the weight and grade of the slaughtered car­
cass. It must be remembered that the final demand is for the 
beef in the cattle, not for the beef cattle itself. Payment 
by deadweight (and by the grade of the beef) has the advan­
tage that the buyer and the seller of the beef exchange a 
quantity of beef which is accurately measured at the time of 
the_ sale. Although this method of payment entails certain 
costs (the carcasses must be labeled to be able to identify 
the owner), it saves both parties the transaction costs 
usually associated with an auction sale. Payment by live- 
weight has further disadvantages. When the cattle are sold 
prior to slaughter, both beef cattle producers and slaugh­
terers will expend resources to attempt to measure the amount 
of beef contained in the animal. To minimize such resource 
expenditures, one party (usually the producer) has incentives 
to hire specialists ("assemblymen”) who are skilled in group­
ing ("assembling”) cattle into homogeneous lots prior to the 
auction. Although measurement mistakes can average out over 
time (this may explain why some auctions restrict the amount 
of information on each beef animal available to buyers), each 
party to the transaction could gain if he could devise rela­
tively cheap measurement techniques to infer more accurately 
the true amount of beef in each animal.
Auction markets are particularly useful and efficient in 
determining the value of beef cattle. However, as long as 
auction markets are generating accurate evaluations of the 
value of beef cattle, some producers and slaughterers will 
have incentives to avoid the measurement costs inherent in 
the auction process, while continuing to use the price 
information it generates.
One of the most important changes in the West German 
beef industry since World War II is the movement of privately 
owned slaughterhouses to the production areas. The general 
implication is that it is cheaper to slaughter the beef at 
the production area and ship the beef in refrigerated trans­
portation facilities to consumption areas rather than to ship 
the cattle to the slaughterhouses in the consumption areas. 
Virtually the only slaughterhouses which remain in the con­
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sumption areas are the public abattoirs, and their movement 
has probably been restrained by political considerations. If 
they are owned by city or municipal governments, these 
authorities may not permit the abattoir to move to the rural 
production areas.
This issue is particularly significant for the marketing 
of beef cattle in Hawaii, as a sizeable proportion of the 
state's beef cattle is currently transported by barge from 
the production areas on Hawaii, Maui, and Molokai to the 
slaughterhouses on Oahu. Some ranchers seem to believe that 
it would be economical to locate the facilities on the pro­
ducer islands due to the relative costs of shipping beef 
cattle and shipping refrigerated carcasses. It is not clear, 
however, that producers would save substantially on transpor­
tation costs if the slaughterhouses were all located on the 
island of Hawaii. A producer on Maui would then have to ship 
his cattle to Hawaii, and the slaughterhouse would then ship 
the beef to Oahu. Presently, the producer on Maui just ships 
the beef cattle to Oahu. Given the fact that producers who 
are not located on the island of Hawaii contribute nearly 40 
percent of the production of the Hawaii beef cattle industry, 
it should be obvious that a change in the location of the 
slaughterhouses would not lead to an unambiguously more 
efficient beef cattle industry. Although the decision con­
cerning plant locations must take into account factors 
besides transportation costs (such as relative rents, wages, 
legal restrictions, and environmental considerations), the 
German example should prompt the slaughterhouses in Hawaii to 
consider carefully the gains from relocation.
It should also be noted that slaughtering and packing 
facilities are quite durable and may have few alternative 
uses. Even if cost conditions have changed to favor the 
building of any npw capacity in this industry on the island 
of Hawaii, it may nonetheless be profitable to continue to 
operate the Oahu facilities until they need to be replaced. 
Thus, unless demand or supply conditions in the slaughtering 
and packing industry change dramatically and thereby make the 
operation of the Oahu facilities unprofitable, we should not 
expect to see these facilities relocated on the Big Island in 
the near future.
Finally, another distinctive feature of the marketing of 
livestock in Germany is the growth of farmers1 cooperatives. 
The cooperatives were originally formed to facilitate the 
assembly and sale of the animals in the auction market. In 
the last fifteen years, however, the cooperatives have become 
increasingly involved in the slaughtering of cattle. In 1966 
producer cooperatives slaughtered 203,000 head of cattle; by 
1975 this figure had increa^fed to 796,000 head, or 18 percent 
of all slaughterings. Further, 33 percent of all cattle are 
sold by cooperatives. Although cooperatives formerly 
required that their members deliver all of their animals to 
the cooperative for marketing, this restriction has been
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dropped by most cooperatives. This action was the result of 
competition from other enterprises and from the alternative 
marketing channel of direct sales; to use these alternative 
marketing channels, it was necessary for an individual farmer 
to remain outside of the cooperative. As more farmers chose 
not to use the cooperative system, the cooperatives began to 
drop the delivery restriction; without the restriction, coop­
erative membership began, once again, to increase.
Although cooperatives are owned by the farmers, most 
cooperatives are not directly managed by the farmers. They 
are usually run as independent business enterprises. As 
noted above, as long as the cooperative members own the 
cooperative’s stock, they will be assured of getting their 
profits from the joint actions of raising and slaughtering 
the beef. They will not be concerned with the division of 
the profits; whether they receive the profits as dividend 
payments from the cooperative or as payment for the beef 
cattle is inconsequential. The primary advantage of the
cooperative system is that it ensures that the farmer will 
receive a "competitive" price for his beef.
The situations in Denmark, France, and Austria are quite 
similar to the one encountered in Germany. In each of these 
countries, three important changes in the marketing of beef 
cattle are occurring. First, liveweight sales at auctions 
are increasingly being replaced by direct sales to slaughter­
houses, and compensation is determined by the weight and
grade of the carcass. Second, the slaughterhouses are
choosing to relocate in the production areas; previously they 
were concentrated in the urban consumption areas. Third, the 
importance of producer cooperatives in the slaughtering and 
sale of beef cattle is increasing.
New Zealand
Finally, it would be helpful to consider the marketing 
of beef cattle in a country which exports large quantities of 
beef to Hawaii, such as New Zealand. Since 65 percent of the 
red meat supplies produced in New Zealand are exported, and 
since New Zealand produces a small percentage of the world 
supply of beef, it is apparent that the price of beef in New 
Zealand is determined by the world market for beef. Ranchers 
do, however, have numerous marketing channels through which 
they can market their beef. The following three are the most 
important:
1. The dominant marketing approach is for the producer 
to make a direct sale to a livestock exporting company. Each 
week these companies post a schedule of prices which they 
will pay farmers for the various grades of meat delivered 
during that week. The schedule is closely tied to 
fluctuations in the price of beef in the United States, which 
is New Zealand's principal export market.
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2. Ranchers can sell their stock to one of two producer 
cooperatives (which do not own or operate slaughter/packing
facilities). These organizations pay a percentage of the 
price quoted by the livestock exporting companies. At the 
end of the year, the residual is distributed to the members 
according to the value of beef delivered to the cooperative. 
The residual depends on the success the cooperative has had 
in marketing its beef over the course of the year. The 
rancher is likely to use this marketing channel if he 
believes that the prices posted by exporters, the "schedule” 
prices, are not reflective of the world market price adjusted 
for slaughtering costs. This marketing technique essentially 
transfers the risk of changes in the price of beef from the 
slaughterhouse to the producer. The existence of an alterna­
tive marketing channel for export beef does, however, tend to 
ensure that the price "schedules" posted by exporters are
competitive prices.
3. The third channel a rancher can use to market his 
stock is to hire an exporter to sell it on a commission 
basis. The rancher arranges to have the stock privately 
slaughtered by a dealer licensed for the export trade. The 
rancher has a statutory right to be able to deliver his beef 
cattle to a slaughterhouse and receive service when avail­
able. Farmers often "pool” their cattle together when they 
market beef through this channel.
In 1976 approximately 5 percent of all export beef was 
marketed through producer cooperatives, 25 percent through 
producer "pool" arrangements, and 70 percent through direct 
sales to exporters. Only a small fraction of export beef is 
sold in a liveweight auction market.
Auction sales of beef cattle are still importapt in New 
Zealand. The cattle are, however, usually intended for the 
domestic market. Many of the animals traded on the livestock 
exchanges are breeder or stocker cattle. Although fatstock 
are also sold at auction, it would appear that the auction 
sale is a relatively inefficient method of marketing most 
fatstock. Since the price of beef is determined in world 
markets, one of the main advantages of an auction market, the 
accurate determination of a good’s value given the informa­
tion currently available to buyers and sellers, would be 
lost. As would be expected, the auction price of fatstock is 
closely related to the world price of beef.
On the other hand, the auction market may be a relative­
ly efficient method for determining the price of stockers and 
breeders. Stocker and breeder prices are based on the 
expected future price of beef in world markets. Since world 
spot markets are more highly developed than world future 
markets, it is to be expected that the New Zealand auction 
market would be able to generate valuable information about 
the prices of these types of cattle. The auction format
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serves to compile the information available to buyers and 
sellers into an estimate of the future price of beef cattle, 
adjusted for the costs of raising and finishing the calves 
and the stockers.
The beef cattle market in New Zealand is also influenced 
by the operations of the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board. 
This government agency monitors the prices export dealers 
offer to producers. Occasionally, the Board suggests to 
producers that they utilize alternative marketing channels 
(instead of the export dealers) to obtain better prices for 
their beef. Under certain circumstances, the Board is 
empowered to buy beef directly from the producers and market 
the beef itself. The marketing is usually done by hiring an 
export firm on a commission basis. The Board has, outside of 
this marketing power, no authority to set prices (the price 
"schedules") offered to producers by slaughterouses.
Under the provisions of the Meat Export Prices Act of 
1976 the Board operates a meat export price-smoothing system. 
A three-year moving average of beef prices is calculated, and 
a ten percent band around this figure is then set. The upper 
bound of this band is the maximum price producers can receive 
for export beef; the lower bound of the band is the minimum 
price. When the price of beef falls below minimum levels, 
the Board can either intervene in the market, or it can make 
subsidy payments to producers. When the price rises above 
the maximum permitted level, a buffer levy of 50 percent is 
charged on the revenue earned from the higher price. The 
Board's operations in this area are intended to be self- 
liquidating; a net subsidy or tax on beef sales is not the 
intent of this price-smoothing operation.
The marketing situation in New Zealand is relevant to 
beef marketing in Hawaii for two reasons. First, the price 
of beef is determined in world markets. Any marketing 
operation for beef in Hawaii must be designed with this fact 
in mind. Second, the producer has alternative marketing 
channels which he can use to sell his beef. The existence of 
alternative marketing channels, such as producer pools, 
producer cooperatives, and sales to the Meat Producers' 
Board, serves to insure that the direct sales market remains 
competitive. Presently in Hawaii, producers have no other 
option but to deliver their cattle to slaughterhouses for 
direct sale or consignment slaughter.
MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Marketing arrangements in many foreign countries are 
characterized by the sale of beef cattle by private producers 
to public slaughterhouses (abattoirs). In the United States, 
slaughterhouses are exclusively operated by private business 
firms. They tend to be independent business firms which are 
not integrated with the producer of the cattle. However,
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slaughtering and wholesaling operations are typically 
combined in a particular variety of firm— the packer. At a 
national level the packer industry is relatively 
unconcentrated; the four largest firms had only 21 percent of 
the market in 1970. Of course, national concentration levels 
may mask significant levels of concentration in local 
markets.
On the Mainland packer feeding of cattle remains a 
relatively unimportant activity. In 1974 only 6.8 percent of 
fed-cattle marketings were done through packer stockyards. 
Packer feeding tends to be concentrated in the Western and 
Plains states, particularly in those states that are not 
major producers of feed grains. It is virtually nonexistent 
in Corn Belt states. Most cattle in Hawaii are fed by the 
packer in a specialized feedlot, Only about 40 percent of 
the cattle slaughtered by the packer are his property. The 
other 60 percent are owned by the rancher. Furthermore, 
virtually all feeder calves in Hawaii are owned by the ranch 
while they are being custom-fed by the packer.
The major development in the packing industry since 
World War II is the movement of the packers from the urban 
consumption centers to the rural production centers. Note 
that a similar trend was also observed in Western Europe. 
The relocation was due to the development of commercial 
cattle feedlots which were located in the grain-producing 
areas of the country; to lower labor costs in rural areas; to 
technological advances in the transportation industry which 
made it relatively advantageous to ship carcasses and 
finished products to retailers rather than shipping live 
cattle to slaughterhouses; and to decreased costs of assem­
bling the desired group of livestock. As was previously 
noted, in Hawaii many live cattle are shipped via barge to 
slaughtering plants located near the consumption areas on 
Oahu.
The term ”beef cattle producer” encompasses a wide range 
of heterogeneous enterprises in the United States. A p r o ­
ducer” may be a small cow-calf farmer, a huge corporation 
specializing in the feeding of cattle, or a rancher who 
breeds and finishes his entire stock. The market is char­
acterized both by tremendously specialized firms and by ver­
tically integrated firms. The two types of operations appear 
to coexist in a stable industry structure.
Cooperatives play a relatively minor role in the mar­
keting of beef cattle in the United States. Their share of 
the fed-cattle marketings has declined from 16 percent in 
1951 to 10 percent in 1972. In Western Europe the coopera­
tives are usually vertically integrated with the packing 
operations. In the United States such vertical integration 
is extremely rare; only one percent of the total number of 
cattle and calves slaughtered in the U.S. are slaughtered in 
cooperative slaughterhouses. The cooperatives have concen­
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trated on the sale of cattle in liveweight markets. Some 
cooperatives have established credit corporations to finance 
member purchases of feeder stock. No cooperatives exist on 
the Mainland for the purpose of purchasing supplies exclu­
sively for livestock producers. Finally, the cooperatives 
that do exist are relatively small. In 1970, four-fifths of 
all cooperatives had gross revenues under one million 
dollars.
Transactions between producers and packers occur in 
three different types of institutional settings: direct
sales from producers to packers, sales at auction, and sales 
at terminal markets. During the 1970's, approximately 70 to 
75 percent of all sales were direct sales from producer to 
packer, 15 percent werw in auction markets, and 10 to 15 
percent occurred in terminal markets. How are prices formed 
in these different types of settings? Terminal markets are 
usually operated by stockyard companies. Rather than pur­
chase and resell livestock, they derive their income from 
fees on the use of the facilities, the sale of feed and other 
services. Buying and selling of livestock is open to the 
public. The sale of livestock is, however, managed almost 
universally by representatives of commission firms. Terminal 
markets are distinguished from auction markets by their 
practice of arriving at exchange prices by "treaty." The 
buyer and the seller bargain in private and the outcome is 
not publicly revealed. Most cattle markets in the U.S. (for 
example, the Denver market) have both auction and terminal 
markets coexisting in the same physical facilities.
To sell cattle in a terminal market, the producer 
usually delivers his cattle to a commission man several days 
before the opening of the market. The cattle are sorted by 
the commission mand into lots according to their distinguish­
ing characteristicsto facilitate the process of evaluating 
the cattle at the point of sale. Fixed-fee commissions are 
charged by the terminal market per head of cattle regardless 
of the worth of the cattle. The importance of the terminal 
market has rapidly declined in recent years. In 196O, 46 
percent of all cattle were marketed through terminal markets. 
By 1969, the figure had shrunk to 21 percent, and had
declined to between 10 and 15 percent of the market in the
late '70s.
The auction market has been more stable over time than 
the terminal market. The percentage of finished cattle 
marketed through auctions has stayed relatively constant,
between 15 and 20 percent of the market, since 196 0. The 
auction market has, however, become more important in the 
marketing of calves, increasing its share of the calf market 
from 32 percent in 1960 to 50 percent in 1969. This increase 
in business has occurred mainly at the expense of the
terminal markets.
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Auction markets are distinguished from terminal markets 
by the price formation mechanism used to transact the sale. 
Bids are publicly announced by buyers and are relayed to 
other potential buyers by an auctioneer; the bidder offering 
the highest price receives the animal. The ring manager 
often offers a starting bid to economize on the number of 
bids which must be offered to sell the animal. Sales occur 
either by weight or by head. In some markets the animals are 
weighed before they enter the auction ring, but in others 
they are weighed only after they leave the ring. Commission 
fees are either per head or a percentage of the proceeds of 
the sale or a combination of the two. The auctions are 
public markets; by law they are open to all bidders. The 
auctions are under the jurisdiction of the Packers and 
Stockyard Act. The Act specifies three major restrictions on 
the operations of the stockyards. First, they must post a 
bond equal to two days of sales to insure that producers are 
compensated for the sale of their stock. Second, they must 
transmit annually records of all transactions and payments to 
the United States Department of Agriculture. Third, they 
must refrain from trade practices which restrict competition.
Direct sale to packers is now the dominant form of 
marketing fed cattle on the Mainland. The sale may be on 
live weight and grade of the finished cattle or on the 
deadweight and grade of the carcass. The following passage 
summarizes a set of regulations the USDA promulgated in 1968 
to standardize trade practices when a sale is made on the 
basis of the deadweight and grade of the carcass:2
(l) packers must divulge to sellers, either orally 
or in writing, terms of the purchase contract 
prior to sale; ( 2) identity of each carcass must 
be maintained; (3) sufficient records must be 
maintained to verify settlement with producers;
(4) purchase and payment must be made on the basis 
of carcass prices; (5) weight must be established 
on the hot carcass (not chilled); {6) all hooks, 
rollers, gambels, and other equipment must be 
uniform in weight for each species and only this 
weight deducted as tare; (7) payment may be made 
on USDA grades or other grades, but if the latter, 
the seller must furnish written specifications; 
and (8) carcasses must be graded no later than the 
close of the second business day following slaugh­
ter.
Direct sales have several advantages to most producers 
of fed cattle. First, the conditions of the sale can be 
negotiated before the cattle are delivered. If the cattle 
are to be sold in an auction market or a terminal market,
2McCoy, Livestock and Meat Marketing.
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they must be transported to the market site. Given the extra 
transportation costs involved if the cattle are not sold (the 
costs of transporting the cattle back to the ranch and at a 
future date transporting them back to the market), the 
rancher does not usually have an effective option of with­
drawing the cattle from the market. If, instead, they are 
directly sold to the packer, the offers from various packers 
can be solicited and examined before the cattle are committed 
to market.
Second, if packers usually purchase from a particular 
group of producers, and producers usually sell to a partic­
ular group of buyers, then the transaction costs associated 
with finding "acceptable" buyers and sellers are reduced, and 
both parties to the direct sale must gain. By "acceptable," 
we mean that the two parties exchange at the "competitive” 
price; i.e., at the price that would be determined if both 
parties were participants in an auction market. The 
transaction costs associated with "finding acceptable buyers 
and sellers” are the costs the two parties incur from 
participating in an auction or in a terminal market. These 
costs include the losses the two parties incur from buying 
goods measured by liveweight rather than by deadweight, 
market fees, commission fees, and transportation costs.
Third, if price information from an auction market is 
readily and speedily available to the two parties, then it 
becomes more likely that they will transact by direct con­
tract sales. Essentially the two parties "free-ride” on the 
information generated by these markets. In some countries 
(West Germany) these direct contractual transactions are 
taxed; the tax may be looked at as compensation for the price 
information generated by the auction market. If, however, 
low-cost information about the prevailing prices for the type 
of cattle being exchanged is unavailable, then it becomes 
less likely that the two parties will exchange via direct 
sale contracts. A more intensive search over the entire set 
of sellers and/or buyers could yield a better price for one 
of the parties (which would more than compensate them for 
their search costs— in this case, the costs of participating 
in an auction).
Is price information in the United States readily 
available and is it reflective of the transactions that occur 
in the direct sales market? The availability question is 
easily answered; the daily prices recorded on the West Coast 
auction markets are compiled in a weekly publication of the 
USDA entitled Livestock, Meat and Wool Market News. Although 
prices would tend to reach farmers in Hawaii with a week's 
lag time, given the weekly variability in prices in the beef 
cattle market, the time lag is unlikely to cause severe 
problems to transacting parties.
Whether the prices that are observed in the auction 
markets are reflective of conditions in the direct sales
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market is a more difficult question to answer. The types of 
cattle which are offered on these markets are likely to have 
a relatively uncertain value, and they are bought by a 
clientele of packers or other firms which highly varies from 
week to week or period to period. Even if the cattle prices 
which are determined at auction are good indicators of the 
value of a specified type of cattle, they may be useless as 
an indicator of the value of the cattle being exchanged in 
direct sales markets. As the auction market become smaller, 
this phenomenon is more likely to occur. The prices observed 
on organized exchanges will then be only loosely correlated 
with the prices observed in direct sales markets. One 
consequence of the increasing size of errors in the 
measurement of market value is that the two parties will have 
increasing incentives to invest in accurate information about 
the goods' value. such investment, however, tends to 
dissipate the gains from transacting by direct contractual 
sales rather than in an auction or terminal market.
As an alternative to the mechanism described above, 
firms may decide to pool information about the prices and 
quantities of the goods being exchanged. The information 
could be compiled by a trade association or private firm and 
be issued (or sold) periodically to all concerned parties; 
Cattle Fox of Denver, Colorado, is already doing this. The 
availability of such information should help the direct sales 
market to produce contracts which specify prices and quan­
tities similar to those which would be observed in an auction 
market. The costs of an auction market would have to be 
weighed against the costs of operating the newsletter, the 
costs to individual firms of disclosing certain sensitive 
information about transaction prices and quantities, and the 
costs of using "old" information.
It should be noted that the compilation and publication 
of transaction prices may have significant costs .if. the 
information is used to enforce a cartel agreement among 
cattle producers. Accurate information about transaction 
quantities and prices is vital to the enforcement of any 
cartel agreement. Given the extensive nature and the number 
of firms entering and exiting the beef cattle industry, a 
cartel is unlikely to be profitable over time, and, 
therefore, exchange of price information should lead to gains 
in producer efficiency and profitability. With the decline 
in the use of auction markets, and the high costs of forming 
a cattle producers' cartel, the marketing of beef cattle in 
the United States has been subject to some of the same types 
of trends which were observed in Europe. First, deadweight 
sales have become the dominant form of exchange between 
producer and packer. Since the auction market still 
exchanges a significant number of finished cattle, stockers, 
and calves, the parties to a direct sales contract can free- 
ride on the price information generated in the auction 
markets.
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Second, unlike the situation in Europe, livestock 
cooperatives are relatively unimportant in the United States. 
They engage in virtually no slaughtering activities, and are 
a relatively unimportant part of the market structure.
Third, packers have gradually relocated from the con­
sumption areas to the production areas.
Finally, the market is characterized by a wide variety 
of vertically integrated firms and extremely specialized 
firms. Specific trends concerning vertical integration or 
vertical disintegration have not been observed. The pro- 
ducer-packer market appears to be capable of sustaining a 
wide variety of institutional arrangements over time.
ALTERNATIVE MARKETING AR^RANGEMENTS
In this section we discuss alternative possibilities for 
the marketing of beef cattle in Hawaii. Any alternative 
marketing arrangement must take into account several char­
acteristics of the Hawaii beef cattle industry. The char­
acteristics are presented below. It must also be noted 
immediately that no alternative marketing structure is likely 
to be vastly superior to the present structure. Should a 
superior system exist, the involved parties would have 
already devised institutions and contractual arrangements to 
appropriate the gains from such a system. One of the salient 
points which characterizes all economic systems is that the 
prevailing institutional arrangements are likely to be the 
most efficient possible given the constraints the 
institutions face. Although three alternative marketing 
arrangements are presented in this section, we cannot presume 
that any system would be more efficient than the present 
system, given the existing technological and institutional 
situation.
What are the characteristics of the Hawaii beef cattle 
industry with which any marketing arrangement must be con­
sistent? First, the Hawaii beef industry has little 
influence on the market price of beef at the wholesale level. 
The supply of beef from Australia, New Zealand, and the 
Mainland United States is perfectly elastic at the prevailing 
world (United States) price, adjusted to reflect 
transportation costs.
Second, production takes place on all islands in the 
Hawaiian chain (although primarily on the Big Island) while 
consumption is concentrated on Oahu. Currently, 60 percent 
of the packing capacity is also located on Oahu. Forty-four 
percent of the cattle slaughtered in the State are 
slaughtered in one plant on Oahu; 12 percent are slaughtered 
in a second plant on Oahu; 17 percent are slaughtered in a 
large plant on the island of Hawaii. Thus three large plants 
handle 73 percent of the cattle slaughterings in Hawaii. The
20
two largest packers engage in considerable wholesaling of 
carcasses, while also selling primals and processed beef.
Third, the largest packer is essentially vertically 
integrated with the largest ranch and the largest feedlot; 
although all three corporations are legally separate, their 
common ownership requires us to treat them as a single 
economic entity. Although there is a single large firm in 
the packing industry, it should be noted that entrance to 
this industry is relatively easy compared to most food 
processing industries. If this firm attempted to exercise 
its "market power," we would expect the small packers to 
expand capacity, and new entrants to start production. Size 
does not necessarily imply market power.
Three alternative marketing systems are examined in this 
part of the report: (l) the formation of a cooperative
association to control the marketing of beef; (2) the estab­
lishment of auction or terminal markets in Hawaii; and (3) 
the establishment of some form of producers' cooperative. 
Some of the legal ramifications of cooperatives are also 
discussed. Although there are many more than three possible 
arrangements, some marketing structures are clearly ineffi­
cient given the characteristics of the Hawaii beef market, 
and these three alternatives encompass the major marketing 
arrangements existing worldwide in the beef industry.
Marketing Cooperatives
The first alternative structure considered is a mar­
keting cooperative. This type of cooperative has been 
extremely successful in other fields of agriculture in the 
United States. Examples are the C&H Sugar Cooperative, 
Sunsweet, the Lindsay Ripe Olive Co., Welch's Grape Juice, 
and Sun Maid Raisins. Each of these cooperatives attempts to 
regulate the amount of the product placed on the market at 
any point in time. Such action is likely to achieve higher 
prices and higher profits for the producers of these pro­
ducts.
Such a cooperative venture would be doomed to failure in 
the beef cattle industry in Hawaii. A cooperative which acts 
to restrict market quantities can only be successful if a 
large percentage of the major producers of the commodity join 
the cooperative. In Hawaii a major portion of the meat sold 
in the stores and served at restaurants is imported from the 
Mainland, New Zealand, or Australia. Any restrictions on the 
output of Hawaii beef producers would be ineffective in 
changing the market price of beef carcasses. Producers on 
the Mainland and in the foreign countries cited would begin 
to ship more beef to Hawaii at the slightest indication of an 
increased price of beef. If a livestock cooperative is to be 
successful, it must function to reduce marketing costs rather 
than to exercise market power to achieve higher prices.
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Auction Markets
The second alternative structure we considered was the 
establishment of either auction or terminal markets in 
Hawaii.
Auction markets are important mechanisms of exchange 
when the prospective parties to the exchange are unsure of 
the price (value) of the good. Auction markets serve to 
integrate information about the relative supplies and demands 
for beef into an auction price, an indicator of the value of 
the beef. The market price provides all parties with signals 
that can be used to plan future production and future pur­
chases of beef. Under certain conditions, it assures buyers 
and sellers that they are receiving and paying the "competi­
tive" price of the beef. Auction markets have the central 
disadvantage of being costly to operate. The costs asso­
ciated with gathering the market participants and the cattle 
in one place are significant.
The main advantage of an auction market—  price deter­
mination —  would not accrue to the beef industry in Hawaii 
since the price of beef is determined by world markets and 
Mainland markets. An auction market for beef cattle in 
Hawaii would be likely to generate prices which closely 
correspond to the prices prevailing on the Mainland. Its 
operation would be redundent.
Auction markets are not cheap to operate. They usually 
require an initial fixed expenditure to buy or rent physical 
facilities and equipment. Daily operating expenses must also 
be covered. Therefore the auction must charge fees for the 
use of the auctioneering facilities. Given the relatively 
small volume of beef produced in Hawaii (compared to many 
other countries and states), it is unlikely that the market 
would be able to operate at a profit.
Finally, it is impossible to compel producers and 
packers to use the auction market. Most producers would wish 
to save the market commission fees by negotiating sales 
directly through one of the Islands' three large packers. It 
should also be noted that the two large producers would have 
no incentives to participate in an auction sale. Without the 
participation of these firms, the auction market would be 
even less likely to cover its costs.
It could be argued that an auction market would be 
useful to exchange feeder calves, stockers, or breeders. If 
the generated prices were sufficiently different from 
Mainland prices, the auction would generate important 
information to all parties in the Hawaii beef cattle 
industry. Unless local production conditions relevant to the 
production of fed cattle are highly variable and unrelated to 
changes in Mainland conditions, the auction price would be 
redundant. It is quite likely, that the auction price would
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be systematically related to the Mainland price. Unless it 
can be demonstrated that production conditions of Hawaii vary 
substantially and are unrelated to Mainland variations, then 
an adjustment to the relevant Mainland price would appear to 
be an efficient method of setting local prices. This is the 
current practice in the State for most sales of intermediate 
cattle (feeders, stockers, breeders).
Terminal Markets
Similar objections would seem to apply to terminal 
markets. It is quite unlikely that they would improve market 
efficiency in Hawaii. Both the auction and the terminal 
market have a tremendous disadvantage: the sale is on the
basis of live weight rather than yield grade. The sale of 
beef by its "deadweight" and grade has two advantages over 
live weight sales. First, it gives signals to producers to 
produce "beef" not ”beef cattle." The packer and the con­
sumer are interested in the transaction of a pound of beef. 
The beef cattle producer must be given incentives to produce 
beef cattle which are appropriate to the final consumer 
demands. Second, live weight sale involves measurement 
errors. A live animal that a buyer thought had X amount of 
beef, may only have 90 percent of the estimate. Alternative­
ly it may have 110 percent of the estimate. Although these 
errors may tend to average out over time, this will only 
occur if buyers and sellers do not expend resources to try to 
identify the cattle which have 110 percent of the estimate. 
Both parties have incentives to devote resources to measuring 
the beef in the cattle more accurately. The buyer will sort 
the cattle into homogeneous lots; the sellers will try to 
identify cattle characteristics which imply a better yield of 
beef than the average. These costly activities could be
eliminated if the exchange were to be conducted in terms of
deadweight and grade.
It should be noted that these types of exchanges also 
use costly resources. Exchange is never costless. Scales of
the desired accuracy must be purchased; the cattle must be
identified when they arrive at the slaughterhouse to insure 
that the owner of the cattle is paid; similar considerations 
apply to the carcass. Finally, payment to the cattle pro­
ducer is delayed until the slaughtering is complete. With
live weight transactions, payment is received prior to
slaughtering. The timing of the payments will be reflected 
in the transaction price of the beef cattle.
Thus auction and terminal markets are unlikely to be
efficient given the situation of the beef cattle industry in
Hawaii. The main objection to such markets is that the price 
of the beef cattle has essentially been established in 
Mainland markets, and that, given an established product 
price, the deadweight method of exchange appears to be more 
efficient than the liveweight method.
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Producer’s Cooperatives
A third alternative marketing arrangement is for a pro­
ducers' cooperative to handle the slaughter and perhaps the 
marketing of the cattle. This type of arrangement is likely 
to be favored by the smaller producers in the State. Many of 
them have complained that the prices they receive for their 
beef cattle are not competitive prices. This type of
marketing arrangement could be implemented in two ways: 
either all of the producers could organize to form a coopera­
tive; or, the fringe producers (all of the producers in the 
State except the two largest producers) could organize a 
competing feeding-packing arrangement.
The first arrangement is likely to succeed only if the 
two largest producers in the State would gain from such an
arrangement. Both producers already have vested interests in
slaughter facilities and the largest producer ownes the 
largest feedlot in the State. That is, some degree of verti­
cal integration already exists in the industry and the two 
largest firms have made investments and are already operating 
in a fashion that should maximize their returns from the 
entire beef production and marketing system (production, 
feeding, slaughtering and packing). The two large firms 
would only benefit if significant economies could be obtained 
in feeding, slaughtering, and/or marketing of beef by the
majority of the industry acting as a single business entity.
If the two largest firms are now able to exert some 
market power over the smaller producers, then the cooperative 
arrangement would not be advantageous to the two large firms. 
Cooperatives return the residual after paying production and 
operation expenses; therefore, the returns from the market 
power over the smaller firms would be dispersed to the 
smaller firms. Since the two large firms pocket any gains 
from (any potential) market power under the current marketing 
arrangements, they are unlikely to participate in a cooper­
ative venture requiring the dispersion of some of their 
present earnings to the smaller producers.
The only rationale for a producers' cooperative at 
present would be if significant economies of scale could be 
achieved by operating larger feedlot and slaughtering plants. 
If such economies of scale did exist, then we would have 
expected the existing firms to be already taking advantage of 
them. However, the existing system where feeding is done on 
a custom basis, where the custom fees are determined by the 
costs, may lessen the potential benefits of larger operations 
to the larger firms. We would expect to observe that the two 
large firms have merged or that they have proposed a 
cooperative producers' organization. The industry support 
given to this study may be an indication that the firms are 
considering such an action. It should be noted that although
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economies of scale in production are often present, they may 
be negated by transportation costs, by rising management 
costs, or by increased market power possessed by the larger 
firm. To achieve economies of scale .in production is no 
guarantee of lower costs in total.
Another possible obstacle in the way of a producers' 
cooperative which encompasses all producers is that coop­
eratives are generally governed by majority rule on a "one- 
rnember, one-vote” basis. This is part of both the Federal 
and the Hawaii Law on Agricultural Cooperative Associations. 
(As is explained below, the Hawaii statutes permits the 
cooperative to change this rule in its charter. However, no 
such provision could be found in the Federal statutes.) 
Since the two firms which produce a significant proportion of 
the beef cattle in Hawaii would have only two votes in such 
an organization, it is unlikely that they would participate. 
The possibility that the smaller firms would band together to 
extract some of the larger firms' wealth would be significant 
in this context.
It is therefore not obvious that a producers' coopera­
tive association would succeed in the Hawaii beef cattle 
industry. The presence of two large firms may place too many 
stumbling blocks in the way of this new institution's 
formation.
A cooperative arrangement among the fringe producers of 
beef cattle is another possible market organization alterna­
tive. Such a cooperative would avoid many of the problems
caused by the presence of the two large firms. It could take
two possible forms. Either it could market its members'
cattle to the existing slaughterhouses or it could establish 
its own slaughterhouse. These types of arrangements are only 
likely to be viable if the two large firms are exercising 
significant market power over the group of small producers or 
if the two large firms are making business decisions which 
are not appropriate to the market situation in Hawaii. The
second assertion will be ignored; we will assume that the
existing slaughterhouses are competent analysts of the
current and future market conditions. The first assertion is 
also questionable. Twenty-five to thirty percent of the beef 
cattle sold in Hawaii is sold to small slaughterhouses. If 
the two large slaughterhouses actually possessed monopsony 
power in this market, then we should observe that the market 
shares of the small slaughterhouses would increase over time. 
Presently no data are available to support this contention• •
Let us assume, however, that the formation of some form 
of a producers' cooperative is a feasible venture. The Hawaii 
Law on Agricultural Cooperative Associations specifies 
several conditions that an agricultural cooperative must
satisfy. First, 75 percent of the products marketed by the 
cooperative must be of Hawaii origin. This restriction would 
limit any cooperative from marketing significant amounts of
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beef imported from the Mainland or from New Zealand or 
Australia. Such a limitation may make the cooperative a less 
viable venture than it otherwise would be. Quite often it is 
impossible to meet a marketing order with supplies which come 
only from Hawaii producers. Other cooperative ventures in 
Hawaii have managed, however, to evade this restriction by 
setting up subsidiaries not subject to these restrictions.
Second, unless otherwise provided in the cooperative's 
charter, decisions within the cooperative are to be made on a
"one-man, one-vote” basis. The charter can be amended by a
two-thirds vote of the members. The provisions concerning 
preferential stock rights may only be amended, however, by 
the written consent of the holders of two-thirds of the 
outstanding preferred shares.
Third, the cooperative cannot bind members to arrange­
ments which last longer than ten years. This provision is a
significant improvement over the restriction which formerly 
applied. Under the original Hawaii Cooperative Law (5421-18, 
amended by Act 103, SL 1972) the cooperative could not bind 
members to agreements lasting longer than four years. This 
provision placed severe restrictions on the type of 
facilities in which a cooperative could invest. Many 
observers of cooperatives in Hawaii believe that it led to 
cooperatives being undercapitalized3•
Fourth, cooperative stock must be fully paid for at 
issuance; and, stock may not yield dividends worth more than 
8 percent of the stock'svalue annually. This type of 
restriction on the financial structure of the cooperative is 
unlikely to increase the prospects that it will be viable. 
If tax laws change, say, to favor the taxation of dividends 
over capital gains, the cooperative will not have the needed 
flexibility to adjust to such changes, due to the limitations 
on dividends.
Fifth, the Hawaii Agricultural Associations Law speci­
fically states that "associations are not in restraint of 
trade*.” Further, an "association may acquire, exchange, 
interpret, and disseminate to its members, to other cooper­
ative associations, and otherwise, past, present, and pros­
pective crop, market, statistical, economic, and other 
similar information relating to the business of the 
association, either directly or through an agent created or 
selected by it or by the other associations acting in 
conjunction with it5." This provision is important, as a 
cooperative formed by the fringe producers would be mainly 
concerned with compiling price information and disseminating 
it to its members.
3Spielmann and Barmettler, Financing Farmer Cooperatives,
*Hawaii Revised Statutes (1976), Sec. 421-20.
5 Ibid.
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The statement that agricultural associations are "not in 
restraint of trade" is qualified by a second provision which 
allows the cooperative to advise members about their "current 
and prospective production" and to set up "orderly marketing 
arrangements." These activities are only allowed as long as 
they "assure adequate supplies without undue enhancement of 
prices or the accumulation of any undue surplus&." It is 
difficult to imagine how a firm could be in restraint of 
trade if it did not unduly enhance prices. Although the law 
contains contradictions on this issue, it should be noted 
that the State has never prosecuted a cooperative for 
restraint of trade under this law. In any case, given the 
elastic supply of Mainland beef, it appears impossible for 
producers to unduly enhance price. Restraint of trade could 
not in. an issue i n ^ ^  formation .Qf. s cooperative in this 
industry.
Sixth, "an association may admit as members only bona 
fide producers of agricultural products, including tenants 
and landlords receiving a share of the crop, and cooperative 
associations of the producers7.” This provision is especial­
ly important given the current structure of the packing 
industry in Hawaii. The two large packing firms which pre­
sently have 85 percent of the market would have to be 
reorganized as a branch of the producers' cooperaative. They 
would not be allowed to join the cooperative as full voting 
members. Numerous cases in the Federal Courts have estab­
lished that cooperative ventures must be restricted to 
primary producers8•
Seventh, the cooperative "may require members to execute 
contracts with the association in which the members agree to 
patronize the facilities created by the association, and to 
sell all or a specified part of their products to or through 
it^.^" The contract may specify sums to be paid by the 
members in case of breach of contract10• This provision is 
also vital to the successful operation of a beef cattle 
cooperative in Hawaii. If the cooperative is to invest in 
slaughtering facilities, it may only be profitable to under­
take such an action if the cooperative can be assured that 
members will patronize the facility. Although it will usual­
ly be in the interest of all cooperative members to patronize 
the cooperative as a group, at any particular point in time, 
an individual member may decide that he has better opportun 
ities. If an individual perceives that he can gain by 
patronizing other services, he is acting on the realization
‘Ibid.
7Hawaii Revisied Statutes (1976), Sec 421-10.
8The latest and most important decision by the U.S. Supreme 
Court is National Broiler Marketing Association Y.s.. United 
States, 436 .S. 816 (1977).
8Hawaii Revised Statutes (1976), Sec. 421-18.
10Ibid.
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that his actions are likely to have little effect on the 
cooperative. If, however, several members act in this way, 
then the aggregate effect can be quite large. Thus many 
cooperatives with investments in highly specific and highly 
valued capital equipment are likely to utilize a rule 
requiring members to patronize the cooperative.
Eighth, the cooperative has some tax advantages over 
other forms of organizations. Cooperatives pay ”an annual 
license fee of 10 dollars to the director of regulatory 
agencies (and which shall be a general realization of the 
State) which shall be in lieu of all other corporation, 
franchise, and income taxes, and taxes and charges upon 
reserves held by the association for distribution to members, 
including without limitation upon the generality of the 
foregoing any taxes imposed under Chapter 2311."
federal cooperative Law
Given that the Hawaii Agricultural Associations Law is 
structured to encourage the formation of cooperatives in the 
agricultural sector, it is worthwhile to note that the 
Federal Laws on Agricultural Cooperatives are also structured 
to encourage the formation of cooperatives which can 
potentially exercise market power. The two relevant laws are 
Section 6 of the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides that the anti­
trust laws were not to be "construed to forbid the existence 
and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural 
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, 
and not having capital stock or conducted for profit," i.e., 
such organizations are not to be deemed "illegal combinations 
or conspiracies in restraint of trade12 ..."
The Capper-Volstead Act was passed in 1922 to clarify 
the provisions in Section 6 of the Clayton Act and to 
specifically include cooperatives with capital stock in the 
scope of the law 13•
The main section of the Capper-Volstead Act gives a 
description of the powers granted to cooperative associa­
tions:
Persons engaged in the production of agricul­
tural products as farmers, planters, ranchmen, 
dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together in 
associations, corporate or otherwise, with or 
without capital stock, in collectively processing,
31Hawaii Revised Statutes (1976), Sec. 421-23. 
1238 U.S. Stat. 731, Sec. 6.
13 42 U.S. Stat. 388.
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preparing for market, handling, and marketing in 
interstate and foreign commerce, such products of 
persons so engaged. Such associations may have 
marketing agencies in common; and such associa­
tions and their members may make the necessary 
contracts and agreements to effect such purposes: 
Provided, however, that such associations are 
operated for the mutual benefit of the members 
thereof, as such producers, and conform to one or 
both of the following requirements:
First, that no member of the association is 
allowed more than one vote because of the amount 
of stock or membership capital he may own therein, 
or,
Second, that the association does not pay 
dividends on stock or membership capital in excess 
of 8 per centum per annum.
And in any case to the following:
Third, that the association shall not deal in 
the products of nonmembers to an amount greater in 
value than such as are handled by it for members.
A second section of the Capper-Volstead Act specifies 
that the Secretary of Agriculture may act to stop certain 
actions of the cooperative if he believes they are in 
restraint of trade. Conditions of remedy and procedure are 
also included in this section of the Act.
Several cases before the U.S. Supreme Court have
clarified the provisions of this Act. First, the Court has
ruled that the cooperative members must be producers of the 
good if the cooperative is to be exempt from the anti-trust 
Laws1'. A packer, a feeding firm, or a wholesaler could not 
belong to a cooperative unless it was integrated backward to 
the breeding stage 15•
Second, the Capper-Volstead Act does not exclude all
prosecutions under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has
stated that neither Section 6 of the Clayton Act nor Section 
1 of the Capper-Volstead Act leaves agricultural cooperatives 
free to engage in practices against others which are designed 
to monopolize trade or to restrain or suppress 
competition16• One of the results of this conclusion is that 
it is difficult for cooperatives to acquire competitors after
1'See National Broiler, op. cite.
15 Ibid.
16United States Yi. Borden Company etal., 308 U.S. 188, 199­
200.
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they have begun their operations. Cooperatives should be 
especially careful to make all acquisitions at the time the 
cooperative is organized17•
Third, "To give validity to marketing agreements the 
Secretary (of Agriculture) must be an actual party to the 
agreement1 8 The U.S.D.A. has, however, not objected to 
marketing agreements which cooperatives have entered into 
during the last twenty-five years.
it. mugtte concludsdt^t theie^^ virtually Il.Q legal
obstacles .t.Q the formation .Qf. a producers’ cooperative i n the 
Hawaiibeef cattle industry. It has been observed that the 
two largest firms might not find it advantageous to form a 
producers' cooperative. Thus a cooperative may only include 
the fringe producers of beef cattle. It could not, by law, 
include the small slaughterhouses since they are not pro­
ducers of beef cattle, unless the slaugherhouses are owned by 
the cooperative.
Possible Cooperative Operation
How would this type of cooperative operate? One 
possible arrangement would be to assure that its members 
received the best prices available from the currently 
existing slaughterhouses. Since the slaughterhouses
generally assemble and sort the beef cattle they receive, it 
is unlikely that the cooperative would serve any useful 
purpose by taking over this function.
Essentially, the cooperative would serve as a marketing 
agency for the fringe producers. As a marketing agent it 
could operate in either of two ways. First, it could record 
the prices offered by the various slaughterhouses at various 
points in time. These prices could be compared, and cattle 
could be directed to slaughterhouses which offer consistently 
better prices than other slaughterhouses over time. Second, 
the marketing association could attempt to market the cattle 
directly to the slaughterhouse. Prices could be negotiated 
which are tied to the Los Angeles price of beef. This is the 
current practice for all but cow beef. This type of 
marketing arrangement would only be efficient if the two 
larger slaughterhouses are able to exert some degree of 
market power over the small producers. If the market is 
already generating competitive prices for the fringe pro­
ducers, then the resources spent on the cooperative will be 
wasted.
17Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Association, Inc. Y..L 
United States, 362 U.S. 478.
18United States Yi. Borden, op. cite.
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A cooperative formed by the fringe producers could also 
pool the members' cattle into uniform lots in order to 
reduce feeding and slaughter costs. However, given the 
existing custom feeding and slaughter arrangements, it is not 
obvious that the gains from such a venture would accrue 
entirely to the cooperative.
The type of cooperative activity described above has 
several advantages over more extensive cooperative activi­
ties. First, it is unlikely that its activities would 
require significant capital expenditures. It would not be 
necessary for the cooperative to invest in fixed facilities 
specific to the cooperative. Second, the capital that would 
be needed (office space, office equipment) could be readily 
resold on the market if the cooperative venture failed. 
Third, its activities may produce gains for the fringe 
producers even if the market for slaughtering and wholesaling 
of beef cattle is quite competitive. It would place added 
barriers in the way of an operation of a successful packers' 
or buyers' cartel. Fourth, there may be economies achieved 
by having a central agency collect market data rather than 
having each individual producer collect the data.
One final advantage of this type of cooperative is that 
it would not require the participation of all fringe 
producers. Just a few fringe producers could reap large 
gains from the central price negotiation and record-keeping 
processes i£_ prices in this market do deviate significantly 
from "competitive" levels.
One of the most powerful barriers to the operation of a 
competitive market is the absence of good information on 
market conditions. By making uniform quotes from each buyer 
available to all fringe producers and by carefully monitoring 
the Los Angeles price of beef, the marketing agency could 
improve market performance. Without accurate information on 
the prices being offered to all participants in the market, 
individual producers may accept prices which are below the 
market level.
A cooperative could also be organized to include 
slaughter and wholesale activities. The advantage of such an 
arrangement would be that fringe producers would be assured 
of reaping all of the gains from selling the beef at the 
competitive wholesale price. The disadvantages of this type 
of livestock cooperative are (1) it would require large 
amounts of capital to operate; (2) it would require risky 
investments in relatively specific feeding and slaughtering 
facilities; and (3) it would be difficult to determine where 
to locate the facilities. For the cooperative's investment 
to be an economically viable undertaking, the cooperative 
would have to compel its members to use its facilities. This 
agreement would have to be concluded prior to the facility's 
construction.
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Finally, such a cooperative would have to include a 
large percentage of the ranchers and farmers if it is to 
operate successfully. Without the membership of nearly all 
the fringe producers, the cooperative's slaughterhouse would 
be unable to take advantage of significant economies of scale 
in feeding and slaughtering. Since the two largest ranches 
and slaughterhouses are already able to take advantage of 
some existing economies of scale, the cooperative would have 
to be able to achieve a minimum size if it is to compete 
effectively with the two large firms. Since the fringe 
producers usually sell about 25,000 to 30,000 head per year, 
it is clear that unanimous participation in the cooperative 
would be required for it to operate at production levels 
which come close to taking advantage of all scale economies. 
Since only 55,000 to 60,000 head of cattle are marketed by 
all cattle producers in a single year, it is also clear that 
if a cooperative of the nature described above were to be 
formed, one of the existing slaughtering firms would become 
redundant.
This leads us to a central conclusion. It is unlikely 
that a cooperative slaughtering-wholesale venture would be 
successful unless the two largest slaughtering firms cooper­
ated in the venture. Given the nature of the laws on coop­
eratives, these two firms would have to be completely 
reorganized and integrated into the cooperative, since only 
producers can join an agricultural cooperative. The threat 
of such a venture would probably be enough to ensure that the 
two largest firms changed any "objectionable" practices.
On the other hand, it should be noted that ranchers 
already own significant shares in the three major slaugh­
terhouses in Hawaii. If the slaughterhouses were engaging in 
"objectionable" practices, then they would be making profits 
for the same ranchers they were "exploiting." This leads us 
to another conclusion: it is unlikely that small ranchers
will gain from a reorganization of the slaughtering firms due 
to the elimination of practices designed to "exploit” the 
small ranchers.
If there are gains to be squeezed out of a cooperative 
arrangement, they will likely accrue from the better utili­
zation of economies of scale in production. If a large 
slaughtering facility were to be built which could utilize 
existing economies of scale, it is likely that a similarly 
efficient feedlot facility would also be built nearby to take 
advantage of similar economies of scale. If such a facility 
enabled cattlemen to place weaned calves directly into the 
feedlots, more pastureland could be used to produce feeder 
calves and to increase the size of the brood herd. However, 
the percentage of the cattle which are penfed has dropped 
from 61.1 percent in 1974 to 48.7 percent in 1980.
This drop could signify one of three possibilities. 
First, it could mean that pen-fed cattle are becoming more
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expensive to raise than range-fed cattle, and cattlemen are, 
therefore, shifting their production to range-fed cattle. 
Second, the demand for pen-fed cattle relative to the demand 
for range-fed cattle could be declining. Third, the limited 
feeding facilities on the Islands could be forcing the shift 
to range-fed cattle. The larger feeding facility will only 
be economical if the reason for the shift to range-fed cattle 
is the third reason given. Before hasty conclusions are 
drawn about the inefficiency of the feeding and slaughtering 
facilities on the Islands, all constraints on large scale 
production must be taken into account. It is not clear that 
the production economies achieved in Mainland plants can be 
profitably achieved in Hawaii.
CONCLUSION
Numerous marketing arrangements in other countries and 
on the Mainland have been examined. It appears, however, 
that most of these arrangements are not efficient for the 
marketing of Hawaii beef cattle. The present arrangement 
appears to be the best possible given the constraints the 
industry faces. The only possible objection to the current 
arrangement is that the two largest packing firms are able to 
exercise some degree of market power over the fringe firms. 
Given, however, that the cattle are usually slaughtered on 
consignment for fixed slaughtering fees, it is unlikely that 
significant market power exists. Further, since the 
slaughtering-wholesaling firms are partially owned by the 
ranchers, they have no incentives to "exploit" themselves. 
It is possible that significant economies of scale in 
feeding, wholesaling, and slaughtering could be achieved if 
production were organized in a single plant. It is also 
possible, however, that increased transportation and organi­
zation costs would outweigh any savings from decreased pro­
duction costs. If fringe producers are receiving a wide 
array of prices for their carcasses, then a cooperative which 
included a large percentage of the fringe producers could 
improve the prices individual buyers pay by gathering, 
analyzing, and distributing information about the market at 
particular points in time. Any cooperative venture is 
unlikely to be viable unless the two largest producers 
participate.
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